Theory underlying CRM training: Psychological issues in flight crew performance and crew coordination by Helmreich, Robert L.
N87-22635
THEORY UNDERLYING CRM TRAINING:
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN FLIGHT CREW
PERFORMANCE AND CREW COORDINATION
Prof. Robert L. Helmreich
The University of Texas at Austin
INTRODUCTION
I had the pleasure of attending and speaking at the first NASA workshop on
flightdeck resource management and have been involved in research related to the area
from that time (Helmreich, 1979). As the program for this second workshop so clearly
attests, a great deal has happened since 1979. What were then exciting ideas are now
exciting programs. This enthusiastic endorsement of a concept is particularly meaningful
to those of us who are psychologists because the issues in resource management and crew
performance are core topics for social, personality, and organizational psychologists.
In this session, we will try to summarize what psychological theory and research can
tell us about training in cockpit resource management. In doing this, we hope to provide
a framework for the critical analysis of current approaches to CRM training. I will begin
by reviewing background factors and definitions critical to evaluating CRM. This will
be followed by a discussion of issues directly related to CRM training effectiveness.
Finally, I will conclude by describing some of the things we don't know about optimizing
crew performance and the research that is essential to making our efforts as effective as
possible.
DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND
I have already used the terms '_esource management" and "crew performance" and
would like to make a distinction between them. I use the term performance to refer to a
global concept, the total effectiveness of an individual or crew in achieving the goals of
safe and efficient flight operations. Superior performance, both at the individual and
crew level has two distinct components; first, technical proficiency and competence and
second, resource management or crew coordination. I feel that crew coordination is the
cornerstone of resource management, by which I mean the effective coordination and
utilization of all available resources in the service of the flight. These resources are both
inside and outside the aircraft and are both material and human, including especially the
knowledge, judgment and decision-making skills of all crewmembers and the ability of
the crew to bring them together in optimal fashion. While this workshop is focused on
the second, resource management, and we may tend to accept technical competence as a
given, we must never lose sight of the fact that the technical component is critical to
overall performance.
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In the research my colleagues and I have been conducting on fllghtcrew
performance, we have attempted to assess both technical performance and crew
coordination using trained Check Airmen as evaluators. There are several important
facts about the performance data obtained. The first is that the Check Airmen we have
worked with display a high level of agreement or reliability not only in their assessment
of technical proficiency, which is to be expected, but also in the evaluation of resource
management during both line checks and LOFT. This is especially interesting because
the majority of Check Airmen with whom I have worked during the research have
initially expressed considerable uneasiness with the idea of evaluating crew coordination.
While completely comfortable with assessing technical performance, they tend to feel less
adequate in this domain. The data clearly demonstrate that the majority have this
ability. An important implication of this is that we can be confident in the validity of
such assessments. This suggests that the formal assessment of crew coordination as part
of proficiency evaluations is feasible. Consideration of the pros and cons of requiring
such assessment in the future is an important task for the workshop.
The second important characteristic of the performance data is that although the
two dimensions of performance are positively correlated, they still show substantial
independence. This means that a pilot high in technical ability may or may not display
effective crew coordination as a separate and distinct component of flightdeck
performance. The research related to crew performance is summarized in a series of
papers (Chidester? 1986; Helmreich, 1982; Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & Russini, in
press).
It is also essential to our training task that we specify the characteristics of
individual pilots that are related to overall performance. We can identify three broad
categories of characteristics. The first is individual technical ability or aptitude; the
second, personality, the enduring characteristics and motivation of the individual; and
the third, attitudes about personal capabilities and the proper management of the
fllghtdeck.
ABILITY-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS
As we have noted, technical competence is a cornerstone of effective pilot
performance. In addition to the obvious links among ability, training, and technical
performance, there may be indirect effects on resource management. For example, a less
technically-able Captain may be highly defensive and may try to preserve a self-image of
competence through the maintenance of unrealistic, self-deceptive attitudes about
personal competence and resistance to stress and the lack of need for support and
coordination among crewmembers. This Captain may try to project an air of all-
knowing confidence and independence when, in fact, the opposite is true. Such behavior
may have a highly adverse effect on crew coordination.
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PERSONALITY-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS
The role of personality traits as determinants of flight crew performance needs a
thorough re-examination. Although personality factors were implicated as determinants
of flying performance during the massive World War II research program on pilot
selection conducted by Army Air Force psychologists, subsequent research has often
shown inconsistent or weak relationships, leading many researchers and operational
managers to discount the utility of personality factors in pilot selection and performance
(Griffin & Mosko, 1977; Melton, 1947). However, a recent study conducted by our
research group suggests a possible resolution of this dilemma (Helmreich, Sawin, &
Carsud, in press). In a study of job performance beginning with training and continuing
through months of daily performance, it was found that personality factors did not
predict performance in training but became increasingly good predictors of actual task
enactment. The results were interpreted in terms of a '_oneymoon effecttt-the tendency
of all individuals to try hard during the excitement of training for a new position. Over
time, however, as the novelty wears off and the job becomes more routinized, underlying
personality traits begin to influence the quality of performance. The facade of
cooperativeness and eagerness to learn of the pilot trainee may crumble during line
operations, revealing a hostile, arrogant, interpersonally insensitive individual who
cannot work effectively with fellow crewmen. Having surmounted the selection and
qualification hurdles, motivation to hide the V_rue personality" is likely to fade.
The honeymoon effect may be particularly salient for investigations of personality-
performance relationships in pilots since the research in both the military and civilian
sectors has almost exclusively employed performance during training or the simple
completion of training as the criterion against which personality was judged. In other
words, there may have been a continuing tradition of testing for personality effects in
the setting where they are least likely to be found. In research that has used ongoing
line performance as the criterion, consistent personality effects are much more evident
(Helmreich, 1982; Chldester, 1986). For example, among other things, a combination of
high measured achievement (a desire to work hard and master new and challenging
tasks) and a high level of sensitivity to the reactions and concerns of others was
associated with superior line performance. In summary, personality may play a much
larger role as a determinant of flightdeck behavior than we have realized.
ATTITUDE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS
During early NASA investigations of cockpit resource management, a set of
crewmember attitudes relevant to flightdeck behavior and crew interaction was isolated
(Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1979). Building on this work, I developed a questionnaire
measure of performance-related attitudes, covering such areas as Captain and crew
responsibilities and roles, crew interaction, and reactions to stressful events (Helmreich,
1984). Subsequently, these attitudes have been found to be significant predictors of crew
coordination in line operations (Helmreich, et. al., in press). We now have attitude
measurement on more than two thousand pilots from five airlines and the Military
Airlift Command. A consistent finding is that the attitudes of Captains, First Officers,
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and Flight Engineers differ significantly on a number of issues regarding the appropriate
management of the flightdeck (Edwards, 1986; Helmreich, Wilhelm, & Siem, 1985).
Disagreement among crewmembers about how the flight deck should be run suggests
that less than optimal crew coordination may be found and that achieving consensus
regarding management would be a highly desirable training goal.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CRM/LOFT TRAINING
The preceding point marks a logical transition to a discussion of what psychology
can say about the potential of CRM/LOFT training. A good starting point is to define
the capabilities and limitations of training programs as means to effect the modification
of behavior. As we noted earlier, three individual characteristics are major determinants
of pilot performance: ability, personality, attitudes. Obviously, training cannot provide
an individual with raw ability that he does not possess. It can, as we will discuss, help
the individual better utilize his abilities and improve his skills.
A true limitation on the potential impact of training lies in the area of personality.
No training program other than intensive psychotherapy will effect substantial change in
personality. Thus to the extent that resource management and performance are
determined by personality, this is an area where we cannot expect results. The pilot
with a hostile, aggressive personality or a withdrawn, defensive personality will continue
to bring those characteristics to the flightdeck.
The fact that we cannot change personality or ability represents a limit on training
but by no means implies that training cannot effect dramatic change in resource
management. It is in the third area, attitudes, that we can achieve substantial change
in observable behavior. We are also fortunate in that there is a large research base
regarding attitude formation and change on which we can draw. The data on pilot
attitudes clearly suggest areas where training can be beneficial and it is reassuring to
note that most of these are addressed by the programs with which I am familiar. These
include decision making, interpersonal communication, leadership and leader
responsibilities, and personal characteristics and reactions. For example, with regard to
personal reactions, a high percentage of pilots report that their decision making
capabilities are unimpaired by high stress or fatigue--something that is patently untrue.
Changing attitudes about personal limitations may well result in much more adaptive
behavioral strategies and coordinated behavior in critical situations where maximum
effectiveness is a life or death issue.
Research in the attitude area also provides useful information on the likelihood of
change and optimal strategies for effecting and maintaining change. While attitudes can
certainly be changed, they also have considerable inertia and resistance to modification.
(This is a good characteristic; if attitudes were highly malleable, we would be vulnerable
to every commercial, advertisement or pitchman we encounter!). Attitude change also
has much in common with the phenomenon of religious conversion. The new believer is
vocal and enthusiastic about his/her experience, but backsliding is an all too common
phenomenon. From these characteristics of attitude change, we can extract several
guidelines.
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First, the training effort must be credible,powerful,and active. Recipientsmust
believethat the programis meaningfuland likely to producepersonallyusefulresults.
Someearly attempts at resourcemanagementraining weredismissedby line pilots as
'_:harmschool't-attemptsto change personality and create harmony. We are not talking
about getting everyone together and 'holding hands in hot tubs." Participants with such
attitudes tended to discount the whole process. Overall, I think the outstanding work
by NASA and the NTSB has made the concept visible and credible in the industry,
making the training task much easier. Nonetheless, there is still an army of doubting
Thomases who must be convinced and a group who may never be convinced, given their
personalities and defenses. With regard to power and activity, the trainee needs to be
personally involved and actively participating in the process. The classic lecture/text
instructional format does not provide the involvement and personal learning necessary to
effect real change. In this context, LOFT with videotape feedback is one of the most
powerful tools we have. I am convinced that CRM training without the chance for
practice and self-observation that comes with LOFT will be relatively ineffective. There
is also a danger that LOFT scenarios will become widely known and communicated,
leading participants to pre-program. I would recommend serious consideration of this
threat during our working group sessions.
Second, the Instructor/Facilitator/Trainer role is critical. The concepts involved
and complexities of human behavior are formidable. The well-trained, sensitive
instructor can make an enormous difference in impact and outcome. We need to devote
considerable attention to the selection and training of program personnel. This also
implies that we develop strategies to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the
trainers we choose.
Third, CRM training must be continuously reinforced and omnipresent. For the
religious convert, life in a world of sin and temptation without constant reinforcement
leads to backsliding. Similarly, flying in an organizational climate that devalues resource
management and does not reinforce its goals and practices will lead to the decay of the
training impact and business as usual. This implies that one-shot CRM training, even
with a powerful LOFT will not produce enduring change. It is also likely that providing
the training for only one crew position, for example, Captains, will greatly degrade
program effectiveness. It is critical that the concept be endorsed wholeheartedly by
management, pilots' organizations, and opinion leaders in the pilot force to provide a
climate in which the practice will flourish. It is also essential that CRM training be an
integral part of the total training and checking process including initial, transition and
upgrade as well as recurrent. Line Check Airmen can also play a crucial role by
providing feedback and guidance in resource management during daily line operations--
which is where it really takes place. This suggests that the Check Airmen force should
become an integral part of the CRM training process, perhaps with special attention to
selection and training.
In summary, from a psychologist's viewpoint, I am extremely enthusiastic about the
potential of CRM training as a means of effecting real change in the bottom line of safe
and efficient operations. The goals are attainable and we have the technology to reach
them. Having just said that, I must make two qualifications. The first is that there are
limitations on what the training can accomplish, as noted in the case of personality. The
second is that there are serious gaps in the knowledge base necessary to make the
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trainingaseffectiveaspossibleand I would like to close be mentioning some of these.
While we have enormous resources in terms of knowledge and skill in training, we
are trying to effect change in complex behavior where there is often no single best
procedure. As Professor Hackman will stress in his discussion, we know much less about
evaluating the performance of groups than we do about individuals. Let me simply list a
few questions that need answers so that we can make the training most potent. How
much change do we produce in day-to-day resource management on the flight deck?
How enduring is the change produced? Do individuals revert to old, malaclaptive habits
under conditions of high stress? Who are the individuals for whom the training is
ineffective? (If we can isolate these individuals, we could explore special training
strategies. Perhaps even more importantly, we should be able to make considerable
improvements in the pilot selection process.) How do we select and train the most
effective trainers? What topic areas produce the most marked change in behavior?
What training techniques are most effective?
The preceding list is by no means exhaustive, but as you can see it implies a very
substantial research endeavor with a high potential payoff. It would be extremely
helpful if at least partial answers were available before specific requirements for this type
of training become part of the Federal Aviation Regulations. After drafting these
remarks, I was particularly pleased to read the National Transportation Safety Board
Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB/AAR-86/01) covering the Galaxy Electra crash at
Reno. The report presents a sophisticated analysis of the crew coordination difficulties
developing from a mechanical abnormality on take-off and reiterates a call for research
on the most effective means to train all flightcrew members in cockpit resource
management. It further recommends that guidance on topics and training in CRM be
provided until research data suggest optimal regulatory action. This report provides us
with a good framework for deliberation while emphasizing the need for definitive
research.
There are several points I would like to make concerning the needed research and
the evaluation of the effectiveness of CRM/LOFT. I have already noted that personality
factors of crewmembers may provide some limits on what can be accomplished. Second,
the climate and constraints in the organization and environment where the training
takes place will heavily determine the impact the training has. The bottom line is that
it may be extremely difficult to document the true effects of these programs in the short
run. Does this mean that the research is not needed or important? Absolutely not! In
fact, knowing in advance that there are undoubtedly limitations on training eificacy
makes it even more critical that we establish baseline data on the resource management
practiced now and let the data inform us how to increase our effects on all fronts. The
necessary research cannot be conducted in the quiet splendor of the laboratory. It will
have to be accomplished in the complex arena of daily flight operations and will have to
consider the effects of training in the total context of the organization and the regulatory
environment. Conducting meaningful research on these questions necessarily raises
issues of great sensitivity regarding the protection of individuals and organizations along
with concerns for maintaining the highest level of safety. To be. valid, detailed data
must be collected on all aspects of flight operation and related to training practices. This
means, of course, looking at defects and instances of sub-standard performance in a non-
punitive way to make sure the data reflect the true state of the system. NASA's
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Aviation Safety Reporting System is an example of such an approach to data collection,
but it is not typical of the way organizations keep data on flight operations and
proficiency. Good research can be done if those who need the results most critically,
including line pilots, managers, and regulators, cooperate to develop a comprehensive
and competent strategy.
The questions before us are many and complex, but looking at progress since the
1979 convocation in this room, I am confident that the collective efforts of this group
will produce a comparable effect.
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